Before talking with Selker, I was squarely in the anti-DRE camp. After
listening to him, I realize that there is another side to the story that is
being systematically underreported by the technology press. Did he convince
me? Well, let's say that Iım no longer convinced of the inherent correctness
of the anti-DRE position.
So you can imagine how surprised I was by the next thing that Selker told
me. "Of course," he said, "this country is going about election machines
entirely the wrong way."
The current DRE machines, says Selker, are monstrosities. They cost ten
times more than they should. Their designs are secret and their code is
proprietary. And even worse, what precious few facts that have been revealed
in public are deeply troubling.
A few months ago, the source code for a voting machine manufactured by
Diebold was inadvertently left on a Web site. A group of researchers at
Johns Hopkins downloaded the code and analyzed it. They found many software
errors and poor design methodology. One of the most glaring problems had to
do with encryption: although the computer used the DES algorithm to encrypt
the votes, the encryption key was hard-coded into the program and
unchangeable. A key that canıt be changed offers little more security than
using no encryption at all.
Instead of having US taxpayers spend more money on proprietary voting
machines of questionable quality, Selker says that we should follow in the
footsteps of Brazil, which deployed DREs in the 1990s and is currently
working on the second generation of these machines.
Brazil's machines were designed in a transparent, public process by two of
the country's leading research institutions. The national government then
accepted bids from different companies who competed to build machines
according to the open design. Everything was above-board
These voting machines are simple, compact, functional, and have done a great
job to bringing fair elections to the entire country. For example, each
system operates on either wall current or on a set of self-contained
batteries, allowing it to accept votes more than 12 hours deep in the Amazon
jungle without having to be plugged in. The touch screens display not only
the candidates' names but also their photographs an important detail in a
country where so many voters are illiterate. Whatıs more, instead of costing
thousands of dollars, each machine costs just hundreds.
The Brazilian machines are not perfect: they've been criticized because,
like other DREs, they fundamentally cannot be audited after the fact. But
security is a series of tradeoffs: the first electronic election in Brazil
gave voters a printed receipt that the voters had to drop into a box after
verifying it; this receipt was reportedly used for chain voting scams and
the practice was discontinued in the next election.
Selker is convinced that DREs are the way of the future; many notable
computer scientists continue to believe otherwise. "Election technology has
not advanced to the point where it can provide us with electronic systems
that are reliable enough to trust with our democracy," writes Stanford's
Dill on his Web site, VerifiedVoting.org.
My feeling is that elections are in a mess throughout this country: voting
machines are a problem, but so are the voter registration system,
election-day intimidation, and the whole districting process. The problem
with optical scan (the main technological competitor to DRE) is that unless
the ballots are actually scanned when they are turned in by the voters,
there is no way to prevent people from throwing away their votes by making
minor clerical errors on the ballots.
Selker's argument is simple: paper is bad, and whatever problems are
inherent in today's DREs can be overcome by an open design and review
process. Nobody else seems to be making this case. The U.S. DRE vendors want
to sell high-priced proprietary voting machines. Meanwhile the academics
want to stick with paper and all its problems.