[1st-mile-nm] 5g likelihood

Doug Orr doug.orr at gmail.com
Mon May 7 06:57:23 PDT 2018


Generally interesting and relevant wrt the likely antagonistic environment
self-driving cars need to live in:

https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2018/05/criminal-gang-used-drone-swarm-obstruct-fbi-raid/147956/

If you outlaw autonomous frequency jamming drones, only outlaws....

  Doug

On Thu, May 3, 2018 at 8:53 PM Doug Orr <doug.orr at gmail.com> wrote:

> Hey All,
>
> It's been a little while since I scoffed at the likelihood of 5g being
> used as part of an autonomous vehicle control plane, but I was inspired
> recently by reviewing the current set of DARPA
> <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DARPA> research programs.
>
> **Read the following just for fun. Nothing actionable follows**
>
> So, first, you probably know DARPA is the contemporary name for ARPA, the
> defense agency that brought us the Internet. They do advanced research and
> development in strategic defense areas that are very technically
> challenging (referred to as "DARPA hard
> <https://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=DARPA%20hard>," in fact,
> reflecting a level of ambition required for those competing to win various
> DARPA projects).
>
> Worth reviewing:
>
> Here <https://www.darpa.mil/our-research>, is the set of current research
> areas.
>
> Here's <https://www.darpa.mil/work-with-us/opportunities?PP=0> a set
> they're currently soliciting for.
>
> Super smart people looking at the frontiers of the capabilities of the
> industrial world and how to use it for military defense or advantage.
> Really, as a citizen, you ought to have a look, since it's very
> enlightening as to what we're afraid of and what we're pursuing in our
> defense. Between social networking, biothreats, hypersonic vehicles,
> defending against misuse of CRISPR genetic editing, and making it so that
> soldiers can climb vertical walls without ropes...there's a lot of crazy
> stuff there.
>
> With respect to 5g and critical systems (e.g., cars), a few open research
> areas apply, in my reading:
>
> Wireless network defense
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/wireless-network-defense>
> Ensuring that IC development chains can be trusted
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/trusted-integrated-circuits>
> Challenges in millimeter and sub-mm wavelengths
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/thz-electronics> (you need higher sampling
> rates to observe and control these frequencies)
> Using AI to overcome frequency spectrum shortage from device overcrowding
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/spectrum-collaboration-challenge>
> Alternatives to vulnerable GPS systems
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/spatial-temporal-and-orientation-information-in-contested-environments>
> Side-channel attacks in software systems
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/space-time-analysis-for-cybersecurity>
> Reducing vulnerability due to RF jamming attacks
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/signal-processing-at-rf>
> Safely sharing spectrum by military with (other military or) commercial
> users
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/shared-spectrum-access-for-radar-and-communications>
> Making software resilient to reverse engineering attacks
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/safeware>
> Creating distributed control planes not dependent on reliable, high
> bandwidth environments
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/resilient-synchronized-planning-and-assessment-for-the-contested-environment>
> Crazy shit you have to do if you lose some big chunk of the power grid
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/rapid-attack-detection-isolation-and-characterization-systems>
> Generic "holy crap if someone cyberwarfares us we're in trouble"
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/plan-x>(presumably applies to critical
> transportation systems)
> Ability to fly without depending on lots of sensor infrastructure
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/multifunction-rf>
> Operation of small area millimeter wave hotspots
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/mobile-hotspots>
> Model for secure integration of critical systems with Cloud computing
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/mission-oriented-resilient-clouds>
> Jammer-countering measures to enable communication in the face of
> adversarial conditions in shared media.
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/hyper-wideband-enabled-rf-messaging>
> Framework for countering botnets
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/harnessing-autonomy-for-countering-cyberadversary-systems>
> Defense against modern DDoS
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/extreme-ddos-defense>
> Defense against novel cross-network security violations
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/cyber-hunting-at-scale>
> Issues with secure, resilient software updates in embedded systems
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/cyber-assured-systems-engineering>
> Addressing the problem of securing composed heterogeneous systems
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/configuration-security>
> Avoiding surveillance interference in wireless networks
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/computational-leverage-against-surveillance-systems>
> Overcoming additive complexity issues when layering systems
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/complex-adaptive-system-composition-and-design-environment>
> Defense against jamming in crowded spectrum conditions
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/communications-under-extreme-rf-spectrum-conditions>
> Another take on communicating in contested spectrum conditions
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/communications-in-contested-environments>
> Generic systems resistance to cyber attack
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/clean-slate-design-of-resilient-adaptive-secure-hosts>
> Systems that aren't subject to resource limitation attack
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/building-resource-adaptive-software-systems>
> Crazy radar interference shit
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/adaptive-radar-countermeasures>
> Navigation in the event of jamming
> <https://www.darpa.mil/program/adaptable-navigation-systems>
>
> It's kind of a long list. It's unlikely that the mobile telcos have it all
> figured out. So, I'm still skeptical that we ought to be relying on 5g for
> our critical transportation systems in this half century given that *all of
> these research areas, presumably, contain DARPA-hard problems*.
>
> One of my former charges recently got a senior position with one of the
> self driving software companies. He used to be in charge of keeping
> Google's external network reliable. I'll get a reading from him as to
> whether autonomous automobile software vendors believe 5g is as useful as a
> core technology for self driving cars as...mobile network operators do.
>
>   Doug
>
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